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This paper examines the role of innovation brokers in stimulating innovation system interaction 
and innovation capacity building, and illustrates this by taking the case of Dutch agriculture as an 
example. Subsequently, it reflects upon the potential role of innovation brokers in developing 
countries’ agriculture. It concludes that innovation brokerage roles are likely to become relevant 
in emerging economies and that public or donor investment in innovation brokerage may be 
needed to overcome inherent tensions regarding the neutrality and funding of such players in the 
innovation system. The Dutch experience suggests that innovation brokers need to be 
contextually embedded, and are unlikely to become effective through a centrally-imposed 
design. Hence, we conclude that stimulating their emergence requires a policy that supports 
institutional learning and experimentation. In the evaluation of such experiments, it is important 
to note that innovation brokers tend to play intangible roles that are not easily captured through 
conventional indicators. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The multifunctional agricultural sector of the 21st century is embedded in a fast-changing global 
context of market, technology, policy and regulatory settings that present both challenges and 
opportunities. In this fast-changing world, innovation is a central strategy in tackling challenges 
and grasping opportunities and as a means of achieving economic, social and environmental 
goals. Yet, many countries are still struggling with agricultural innovation arrangements and 
policies informed by simpler and more stable techno-economic conditions of the mid-20th 
century. As a result many countries around the world are attempting to reform and evolve their 
agricultural innovation arrangements to develop flexible and responsive capacities. This is 
particularly urgent in developing countries as agriculture remains a central element of the 
economy and innovation is key to the agricultural growth needed to reduce poverty (Thomas and 
Slater, 2006; World Bank, 2008; Bezemer and Headey, 2008).  
 
It is now realised that central to this reform and evolution process is the shift from public sector 
agricultural research — which delivers new technology in an institutional configuration that 
resembles a pipeline — to arrangements that resemble a network or a system of researchers, 
farmers, entrepreneurs and other organisations involved in the creation, diffusion, adaptation and 
use of knowledge, as well as in providing other resources for innovation (Biggs, 1990; Engel, 
1995; Hall et al 2001). Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that agricultural innovation requires 
a balance between new technical practices and alternative ways of organising — for example, 
markets, labour, land-tenure and distribution of benefits (Leeuwis, 2004; Adjeih-Nsiah et al, 
2004; Dormon et al., 2007). In this light, innovation scholars have re-conceptualised innovation 
as a successful combination of ‘hardware’ (i.e., new technical devices and practices), ‘software’ 
(i.e., new knowledge and modes of thinking) and ‘orgware’ (i.e., new social institutions and 
forms of organisation) (adapted from Smits, 2002). These sorts of insights have been elaborated 
through the idea of fostering effective agricultural innovation systems (Hall et al., 2001; Biggs, 
2007; Spielman et al. 2008; Lenné, 2008). In agricultural innovation systems, networks of 
different players are transient and emerge around specific challenges and tasks at particular 
points in time.  Public agricultural research is one of these players, but its value is as a responsive 
element of a network or system, rather than in its own right (Sumberg, 2005; Kristjanson et al., 
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2009).  Other players such as the private sector or civil society organisations have a prominent 
role — not just as passive knowledge users or transmitters, but as pro-active agents who are 
interdependent in working towards effective socio-technical innovations in agriculture ( Hall et 
al., 2001; Leeuwis, 2004; Biggs, 2007). Much of the literature on such networks or ‘coalitions’ 
(Biggs and Smith, 1998) deals with more formalised public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Byerlee 
and Fischer, 2002; Hartwich and Tola, 2007), but it is not only ‘high profile’ PPPs that matter for 
pro-poor agricultural development. As Hall suggests, “Rather mundane and less high-profile 
cases are going to be of the type that planners and policymakers are going to have to deal with on 
a day-to-day basis” (Hall, 2006: 5). 
 
A number of questions remain unanswered when it comes to how everyday innovation capacity 
may be improved. How can a production base made up of many farmers organise its demand for 
knowledge, technology and organisational change? What mechanism will facilitate the search for 
information? Who will coordinate the networks of interaction needed for innovation? A recent 
study by the World Bank (2006) found that even when there were strong market incentives for 
players to collaborate for innovation, linkage formation was still extremely limited. While this 
suggests that an important role of public policy should be to promote these linkages, how can 
this be achieved in practice? Is there a need for an organisation with a brokering role to help 
coordinate multiple players and facilitate partnerships and linkages? Should this be a private 
organisation or a public agency?     
 
As public policy comes to grips with these new ideas it is becoming increasingly apparent that 
intermediary organisations, which sit between and connect different agents involved in 
innovation trajectories in developing countries (Mytelka, 1993; Fisher and Vogel, 2008; Szogs, 
2008), are important as they fulfil boundary work (Kristjanson et al., 2009) and play a role in 
‘bridging’, ‘bonding’ and ‘linking’ social capital (Heemskerk and Wennink, 2004; Hall, 2006). 
Hartwich et al. (2007a: vii) state in this regard that “third-party catalysing agents are necessary to 
bring partners together, motivate them, provide information, and organise space for 
negotiations.” The type of intermediary that is becoming increasingly important is not the 
‘traditional’ third party in a one-to-one relationship, such as conventional agricultural extension, 
but a ‘systemic’ intermediary as an in-between in a many-to-many relationship (Van Lente et al., 
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2003; Howells, 2006). In other words, a role that is neither involved in the creation of knowledge 
nor in its use in innovation, but one that binds together the various elements of an innovation 
system and ensures that demands are articulated to suppliers, that partners connect, and that 
information flows and learning occurs.   
 
These systemic intermediaries play a role as innovation brokers, whose main purpose is to build 
appropriate linkages in innovation systems, and facilitate multi-stakeholder interaction in 
innovation. So far, the agricultural sector has mainly relied on public sector intermediaries such 
as agricultural extension services, often with questionable effectiveness and a limited mandate 
(Leeuwis, 2004: Sulaiman et al., 2005). National governments and development assistance 
agencies now face the difficult task of identifying appropriate mechanisms that can play this 
innovation broker role in the context of the dynamic and evolving contemporary agricultural 
scenario, in which numerous challenges (e.g., sustainability, climate change, poverty alleviation, 
agri-industrial development) need to be addressed simultaneously (see Hall, 2008). 
 
There is already some experience on innovation brokers in the agricultural sector to draw lessons 
from. From a policy perspective it is important to understand the effectiveness of different 
brokerage mechanisms (German and Stroud, 2007; Spielman, 2007). And it is equally important 
to understand the process that governs the emergence and evolution of these mechanisms in 
specific contextual settings (Hall et al., 2005). This is so because past experience has taught us 
that efforts to transplant organisational blueprints from one context to another are unlikely to be 
effective.  
 
The purpose of this paper is, therefore, twofold. Using the case of innovation brokers in the 
Dutch agricultural sector, the paper first explains the circumstances that have led to the 
emergence of these arrangements and discusses the role of policy in facilitating this emergence. 
Secondly, it outlines what these intermediaries look like in practice and discusses the factors that 
determine their effectiveness. The paper concludes with a wider discussion of the implications of 
this experience and, particularly, its implication for developing countries.  Many of these 
countries still have quite some distance to travel in their reform process and are only now facing 
the challenge of strengthening innovation capacity in the contemporary systemic sense. The 
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conclusion of the paper stresses the importance of shifting from policy perspectives focused on 
introducing generic mechanisms to achieve innovation brokering functions to policy perspectives 
that focus on stimulating and enabling the institutional innovations needed to allow these to 
emerge and grow organically in context-specific ways.   Before embarking on this trajectory, we 
first present a brief review of the literature on innovation brokers in order to further clarify and 
demarcate the area of discourse and provide an analytical lens. 
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II. THE ROLE OF INNOVATION BROKERS AS INNOVATION SYSTEM 
CATALYSTS 
 
The roles, performance and effects of innovation brokers for the industrial sector in Western 
countries are quite well-documented (see Van Lente, 2003; Howells, 2006; Winch and Courtney, 
2007; Sapsed et al., 2007; Johnson, 2008). Although being mentioned as a solution to innovation 
system fragmentation and underperformance and being researched in preliminary studies (Clark, 
2002; Garforth et al., 2003; Morriss et al., 2006; Spielman and Von Grebner, 2006; Hartwich et 
al., 2007a; Van Mele, 2008; Kristjanson et al., 2009), the topic is less systematically researched 
in the agricultural sector. This reflects the fact that in the agricultural sector innovation brokers 
have only recently emerged as distinct from the traditional agricultural intermediary organisation 
— namely, the public extension services.  
 
2.1 What is an innovation broker?   
Howells coined the term ‘innovation intermediary’, defined as: “an organisation or body that acts 
as an agent or broker in any aspect of the innovation process between two or more parties. Such 
intermediary activities include: helping to provide information about potential collaborators; 
brokering a transaction between two or more parties; acting as a mediator, or go-between; bodies 
or organisations that are already collaborating; and helping find advice, funding and support for 
the innovation outcomes of such collaborations.” (Howells, 2006, 720). However, the provision 
of brokerage or ‘innovation intermediation’ functions may often not be the primary role of an 
organisation. As Howells (2006: 726) argues, “Organisations providing intermediation functions 
do not solely or even wholly restrict themselves to intermediary functions, but also cover more 
traditional contract research and technical services, which involve no third-party type 
collaboration.” To distinguish such ‘specialised’ brokers from other individuals or organisations 
that provide some brokerage functions, but not as a core function, Winch and Courtney (2007: 
751) define an innovation broker as “an organisation acting as a member of a network of actors 
[..] that is focused neither on the organisation nor the implementation of innovations [sic.], but 
on enabling other organisations to innovate”.  
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2.2 What are the main functions of innovation brokers?  
Innovation brokerage comprises several detailed functions (Howells, 2006; Johnson, 2008), 
which can be reduced to three generic functions (Van Lente et al., 2003, Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
forthcoming):  
- Demand articulation: Articulating innovation needs and visions and corresponding demands 
in terms of technology, knowledge, funding and policy, achieved through problem diagnosis and 
foresight exercises. 
- Network composition: Facilitation of linkages between relevant actors, i.e., scanning, 
scoping, filtering, and matchmaking of possible cooperation partners (Howells, 2006).  
- Innovation process management: Enhancing alignment in the often heterogeneous 
networks, constituted by actors from different institutional backgrounds and reference frames 
related to norms, values, incentive and reward systems. This requires continuous ‘interface 
management’ (Smits et al., 2004) in which there is a ‘translation’ between the different actor 
domains, which has been described as ‘boundary work’ (Kristjanson et al, 2009) and ‘knowledge 
brokerage’ (Hargadon, 2002). Furthermore, it includes a host of facilitation tasks that ensure that 
networks are sustained and become productive, e.g., through the building of trust, establishing 
working procedures, fostering learning, managing conflict and intellectual property management 
(Leeuwis, 2004). 
 
2.3 Reported Risks and Drawbacks 
Despite the potentially important role that innovation brokers can play, there are a number of 
risks and possible drawbacks that have also been identified with regard to their functioning. 
 
- Neutrality tensions  
A key factor for the credibility and legitimacy of innovation brokers is an impartial or neutral 
and independent position (Kolodny et al., 2001; Spielman and Von Grebmer, 2006). On the one 
hand, this is complicated because stakeholders (e.g., financiers or participants) may exercise 
pressure to compose and manage networks in a way that fits their objectives (Isaksen and 
Remoe, 2001), which may result in the broker being seen as a representative of a single 
organisation. On the other hand, maintaining a neutral position is inherently difficult because 
brokers always exercise a certain degree of steering (Laschewski et al., 2002). However, as 
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innovation is about breaking out of current practices, sometimes innovation brokers actively 
need to help ‘destroy’ existing systems to be able to bring about new networks and new ways of 
thinking (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004).  
- Functional ambiguity 
Innovation brokerage can be both a side activity of ‘traditional’ knowledge-intensive service 
providers such as research institutes or extension service providers and the core business of a 
dedicated organisation. This may imply that brokers have overlapping functions with parties for 
whom they intend to broker, and hence may be seen as competitors instead of facilitators.  Also, 
there may be ambiguity about the actual benefit of having a mediating agent (Candemir and Van 
Lente, 2007). As a result of competing functions and role ambiguity, innovation brokers may 
alienate themselves from players in the existing knowledge infrastructure who nevertheless can 
be important for network composition (as possible partners in the network to be formed). 
- Invisible effects/ willingness to pay 
Assessing the impact of innovation brokers is seen to be difficult, given their indirect impact on 
profit and incomes (Howells, 2006). Despite their contribution being quite invisible, they may 
have had a determining role in achieving success instead of failure (Johnson, 2008). Main 
tensions include:  
• Difficulties in ex-ante evaluation of service value and low ex-ante identifiability of 
benefits that affect willingness-to-pay amongst private parties for, especially, functions 
that relate to demand articulation and network composition. Bessant and Rush (1995) 
speak in this regard of brokerage as ‘missionary work’.  
• Funding impatience: Funding is provided for too short a period and this impedes the 
innovation broker from becoming well-established and the networks it supports from 
becoming sustainable (Rosenfeld, 1996). This is enhanced by the fact that the impact of 
innovation brokers on innovation is hard to make visible with current evaluation methods 
aimed at ‘hard’ indicators (Rasmussen, 2008).   
 
The following section will explore if the Dutch experience with innovation brokers in the 
agricultural sector can throw more light on the policy challenges faced by those seeking to 
reform NARS and strengthening agricultural innovation capacity in developing and emerging 
countries. 
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III.  THE EMERGENCE AND ROLE OF INNOVATION BROKERS IN 
THE DUTCH AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION SYSTEM  
 
3.1 The rise and fall of the OVO-triptych 
Historically the Dutch public agricultural research and extension system was characterised by a 
high degree of interconnections among its main actors. This so-called OVO-triptych (meaning 
Research-Extension-Education triptych) has been credited as a key factor in the development of 
innovation capacity within Dutch agriculture and making it an important player in the global 
agricultural scene (Röling, 1990; Roseboom and Rutten, 1998; Smits, 2002). The OVO-tryptich 
embodied the corporatist Dutch agribusiness culture, in which there were well-developed, 
institutionalised linkages and feedback mechanisms and continuous alignment among farmers, 
agri-industry, research and extension establishments and government (Wielinga, 2001). Having 
its origin in post World War II policy on food security, its main focus was the modernisation of 
Dutch agriculture, with a focus on homogenous development paths emphasising productivity 
increase and efficiency gains (Nieuwenhuis, 2002). The OVO approach was seen to work well 
until the mid-Seventies (Wielinga, 2001). However, starting from the 1980s the OVO triptych 
became less successful, and changes were triggered by a set of political, cultural, institutional 
and economic forces (Leeuwis et al., 2006). Growing public concern on health issues, production 
surpluses, increasing environmental awareness in European society, combined with serious food 
production scandals (BSE, swine fever and foot-and-mouth disease), led to reduced support for 
the ‘industrial’ productivity increase paradigm which was dominant in the OVO triptych 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2002). In general, the need was felt for a major re-think of how agricultural 
production in the Netherlands could be shaped to deal with new societal, economical and 
ecological demands, and how the knowledge infrastructure could support that. As policy shifted 
towards reducing the environmental constraints, the interests of policymakers and farmers, which 
were once aligned, started to become increasingly divergent. Publicly-funded research and 
extension became increasingly oriented to issues such as reducing the environmental impact of 
farming, and hence did not align well with farmers’ economic motives. This caused a loyalty 
conflict among agricultural extensionists, who wanted to be loyal to both their paymaster 
(government) and their clients (entrepreneurial farmers).   
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Against these backgrounds, the dominant policy view came to be that the OVO triptych could 
not remain a purely agricultural affair, and that it needed to open up to new societal players (e.g., 
consumers, nature conservationists, the environmental movement, etc.) in order to be able to deal 
with new societal concerns, options and priorities. The agricultural sector (including the OVO 
triptych) was seen to respond rather slowly to the redefined public interest, and it became 
increasingly regarded as an obstacle (i.e. as part of a defensive agricultural lobby) rather than as 
a stimulant of desirable change (Verkaik and Dijkveld Stol, 1989). As part of a wider wave of 
reform and privatisation of public services, the government responded to these problems in the 
OVO triptych by embarking in 1990 on a trajectory of privatisation of research and extension 
establishments, accompanied by the introduction of radical new financing mechanisms and 
procedures (Roseboom and Rutten, 1998). This was not only meant to make room for new 
providers of research and extension services, but was also seen as a way to change service 
delivery culture (of providers) and expectations (of clients), shifting the balance from supply-
driven to demand-driven approaches. The privatisation of public Dutch agricultural research and 
extension establishments induced a repositioning of the different players in the agricultural 
knowledge architecture, according to the new ‘rules of the game’ imposed by the new 
‘knowledge market’ setting in which they had to operate. These policy and institutional changes 
led to increased competition and shielding-off of information among research and extension 
organisations, and weakened the once strong linkages among agricultural research, extension, 
farmers, agri-industry and government (Leeuwis, 2000; Wielinga, 2001), which were seen as key 
factors for the success of the OVO triptych. 
 
3.2. Different types of innovation brokers emerge 
In response to what many experienced as the ‘collapse’ of the OVO triptych a number of 
proposals for new organisational arrangements for agricultural research and innovation support 
were formulated (Enzing et al., 1998; De Groot, 2003). This emphasised the need to come to a 
renewed OVO-triptych, strengthening some of the linkages in the triptych that had weakened 
over time. It was out of this context that intermediary organisations with the function of 
agricultural innovation brokers came to prominence, both as a policy intervention and as a 
pragmatic response of civil society, farmers’ organisations and the private sector to social and 
economic challenges and opportunities.  
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An initial attempt by the government to establish a central innovation broker to channel the 
knowledge flows in the privatised knowledge architecture proved non-viable. Due to its close 
connections to government it was seen to have a biased agenda which did not match with the 
interests of clients. Moreover, the organisation could not cope well with the increasingly 
fragmented, local and autonomous set of networks that emerged after the reform (Wielinga, 
2001). At the same time various types of innovation brokers emerged in a more self-organised 
manner at regional and sub-sectoral levels, with the goal to restore and optimise the linkages in 
the agricultural innovation system. Although such brokers were generally established in a 
concerted effort of private (research and extension providers, farmers’ organisations) and public 
(municipalities, provinces), individual founders were not always altruistic in their intentions as 
goals such as profit-seeking and policy realisation were reasons to invest.    
 
Following the function-based typology of Klerkx and Leeuwis (in press) seven distinct types of 
agricultural innovation brokers can now be seen in the Netherlands. They are discussed and 
illustrated below: 
 
a) Type 1 and 2: Innovation consultants 
These organisations either focus on the individual farmer (Type 1), or on a collective of farmers 
with a common interest and who wish to jointly develop or implement an innovation (Type 2). 
They focus mostly on incremental innovations. They make an innovation SWOT analysis of a 
farm, define an innovation strategy with the farmer, and help to find and guide interaction among 
cooperation partners. Such a SWOT analysis may be on request of the farmer, but sometimes 
they also actively approach farmers (presumably to sell their services).  Innovation consultants 
can be found with different organisational formats — for-profit private firms, government 
agencies, and non-profit foundations. Generally these organisations have emerged out of a 
concern of both public (such as government at local, regional or national level) and private 
parties (such as farmers’ organisations, privatised research and extension establishments) that 
there was a gap between farmers’ innovation needs and existing service provision for technology 
and information supply. These parties either subsidise these organisations or they participate as 
shareholders. Most often, the SWOT type analysis (demand articulation) and the identification of 
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cooperation partners and information sources (network composition) are initially free-of-charge. 
These organisations often have a regional coverage, attending to different types of agricultural 
enterprises. An example of such an organisation is the Agricultural Knowledge Centre North 
Holland (AKC-NH), which emerged out of a concern of closure of a regional experimental 
station after privatisation of the research and extension system. AKC-NH was jointly funded by 
provincial and local government, privatised research and extension providers, regional 
agricultural colleges, and the regional farmer’s organisation. An example of its services is the 
guidance it provided in the search for a ‘flower bulb disease detector’ to automate disease 
detection and reduce labour costs. Instead of ending up at the ‘default’ formerly public 
agricultural research institutes, in its role of a neutral broker the AKC-NH searched for available 
knowledge in public and private, agricultural and non-agricultural, research institutes and R&D 
departments of large companies. Having found a candidate technology, AKC-NH then searched 
for subsidies to conduct feasibility studies as the investment risk for farmers was too high. 
Furthermore, they helped maintain energy and stamina in the process, mediated between the 
different ‘cultural worlds’ of the actors involved, and guided the process of intellectual property 
protection. 
 
b) Type 3:  Peer network ‘academies’ 
These organisations usually have a sub-sectoral focus (such as horticulture, dairy farming, pig 
farming). They focus on the formation of so-called ‘soft networks’, which are concerned with 
knowledge exchange and often have an informal character. In the Dutch agricultural sector, 
informal network structures (so-called study clubs, which resemble farmer learning networks 
such as Farmer Field Schoolsi) traditionally existed, often guided by an external facilitator 
(generally an extensionist or private consultant). Due to changes such as the diversification of 
farmer interests, a decreasing number of farmers, and the fact that facilitation by a consultant 
from a public agricultural extension service is no longer available free of charge, the original 
study club concept was considerably weakened. The peer network academies are an attempt to 
‘revitalise’ the study club concept. An example is the Dairy Farming Academy (DFA), whose 
goal is to set up new farmer networks on the basis of shared interests (see Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
2009). Networking activities include information exchange through an online databank; network 
members’ farms used as demonstration farms; experienced farmers acting as coaches for less-
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experienced farmers; best practice meetings in which farmers discuss a theme of common 
interest; and ‘master classes’ by non-agricultural entrepreneurs. DFA aims to be demand-driven, 
programming working themes based on aggregated demand obtained by analysis of the online 
databank, questionnaires, and on impressions obtained by facilitators during previous sessions. 
To be able to closely identify with farmers’ lifeworlds, facilitators themselves are dairy farmers. 
DFA’s role as an innovation broker thus focuses on demand articulation, strengthening links 
between peers and with the wider set of agricultural innovation actors (network composition) and 
‘gatekeeping’ (bringing in relevant external information and contacts into the networks).  
 
c) Type 4:  Systemic instruments 
The main difference between the systemic broker and the previous two discussed is that the 
former goes beyond individual firms, or clusters or networks of firms, but targets higher level 
innovation architectures that involve complex constellations of business, government, and 
societal actors, dealing with complex problems. This type of innovation broker is often a civil 
society organisation (although with public funding), reflecting its interests in innovation and 
policy issues that go beyond the conventional domain of government or the private sector. An 
example in the Netherlands is the Innovation Network Rural Areas and Agricultural Systems 
(INRAAS), described by Smits and Kuhlmann (2004). It was established in mid-2000 to address 
challenges such as reducing detrimental effects of agriculture on the environment and the need to 
shift from bulk production to multifunctional agriculture. The realisation of this complex 
agricultural agenda required intermediation between a diverse set of agricultural and non-
agricultural stakeholders. The main activities of INRAAS are thus geared towards managing and 
strengthening a collective systemic vision and approach to agricultural innovation. This includes 
foresight exercises, network building, and initiating experiments to jointly identify, develop and 
implement innovative opportunities. Through their efforts, these organisations also want to bring 
about change in ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ institutions, and go beyond participating actors and 
organisations, but also include policies, rules, habits, standards, procedures, and laws. Following 
INRAAS, a number of subsectoral instruments have been set up: SIGN (meaning Dutch 
Greenhouse Horticulture Innovation Foundation), Courage (its name phonetically reflecting the 
Dutch word for cow and the courage needed to innovate) for the dairy sector, and very recently 
‘Kiemkracht’ (meaning ‘germination power’) for arable farming, and ‘Eggnovation’ for the 
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poultry sector. An example is SIGN’s idea of the greenhouse as an energy source instead of a 
major energy user, which at the conception of the idea eight years ago was seen as a ridiculous 
idea, but now there is a working prototype based on a very efficient heat exchanger. 
 
d) Type 5: Internet portals 
A large variation of internet portals has developed in the Dutch agricultural sector, which display 
relevant information, such as agricultural news, market information,  and ‘yellow pages’ of 
service providers whose function is to connect farmers with these information sources. These 
portals may be stand-alone efforts or part of a research project. They are sometimes operated 
commercially, or are paid for from subsidies by government or commodity boards. Examples 
include the Agri-logistics Knowledge Portal for linking actors and knowledge developed in 
several projects related to agri-logistics (Van Baalen et al., 2005), and the web-based question-
answer databank integrated in the previously described Dairy Farming Academy.  
 
e) Type 6: Research councils with ‘innovation agency’ 
Although in the Netherlands traditionally farmer-driven research planning mechanisms exist, 
these do not always forge broader linkages in the innovation system (see Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
2008b). A new sort of research council has recently emerged, in which all relevant actors in the 
organic agriculture value chain (organised in sectoral product workgroups — PWG) have been 
granted decisionmaking authority in research funding, utilising public funds of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (see Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008c). Farmer and industry representatives are expected 
to propose topics based on broadly-shared demand from their constituencies, which they discuss 
and prioritise with so-called research theme coordinators. These feed the researchers within their 
institutes with information from the PWG to guide proposal development to make these fit with 
sector’ needs. Within the PWG, a so-called knowledge manager fulfils the role of facilitator, 
streamlining the flows of information coming from the different system components and 
mediating between the different actor groups involved. Bioconnect also facilitates the 
participatory research that results from the process, as well as the set-up of broader innovation 
networks tackling the issues facing the organic sector, making a link with legislation and market 
developments. 
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f) Type 7:  Education brokers  
Because the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture continues to fund agricultural education, basic 
research and research that supports policymaking, it has responded to a perceived lack of 
interaction between agricultural (vocational) education establishments, research institutes and 
practice by supporting the set-up of the so-called Green Knowledge Cooperation (Kupper et al., 
2006). This Green Knowledge Cooperation, besides linking the several education establishments, 
aims to position the agricultural schools as regional ‘knowledge centres’, who respond to 
innovation queries from the agricultural sector involving both teachers and students. Another 
example from a brokerage arrangement for supporting agricultural education is the so-called 
‘Content Broker’, which helps to find teachers material to use in their classes, such as journal 
articles, educative computer models, and manuals. It does this by making explicit the demands of 
and supplies for the participating organisations.  
 
3.3 The Observed Contribution of Innovation Brokers 
Several studies have looked at the contribution of the Dutch innovation brokers (Klerkx and 
Leeuwis, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; Batterink et al., 2009) in terms of their influence on the 
way innovation arrangements are organised (roles, responsibilities and patterns of interaction) 
and how routine working practices and policies (institutional setting) have changedii. Below we 
discuss the main findings in terms of whether innovation broking mechanisms have (or have not) 
fulfilled the earlier outlined functions (see section II) needed for establishing dynamic responsive 
innovation systems. 
 
In the sphere of demand-articulation they have helped farmers and other agri-food stakeholders 
to think about new possibilities to sustain their businesses. Because of their unbiased position, 
innovation brokers appear to provide a fresh look in diagnosing the constraints and opportunities 
of farmers or, at a higher level, production chains, regions or sub-sectors. Because brokers are 
critical and provide a mirror for self-reflection, they tend to force their clients to look beyond 
their current situation and constraints and, instead, at the possibilities.  
 
In the sphere of network building there are numerous examples where innovation brokers have 
helped farmers and others who want to initiate innovation projects (innovation champions) to get 
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in touch and negotiate with project partners and other relevant stakeholders from the policy, 
market and civil society domain, as well as with suitable knowledge providers who could assist 
them in making changes towards new activities. This included more than just the traditional 
research and extension providers to agriculture. They, hence, make a variety of sources available, 
which is essential for making the ‘new combinations’ central to innovation. At the system level, 
they contributed to the development of innovation agendas and radical and/or system innovations 
to meet future challenges, by performing foresight exercises and initiating innovation projects 
which bear a high risk of failure. This has resulted in several new concepts, some of which were 
initially regarded with suspicion and disbelief, but now have become viable new development 
strategies. 
 
Finally, it has been confirmed that innovation process management is an important function that 
can be performed by innovation brokers. Innovation processes tend to involve different groups of 
actors, who have different expectations and interests, determined by their institutional 
background. For example, farmers often want quick access to applicable knowledge and quick 
results; research providers have an interest in undertaking (publishable) research, policymakers 
want to realise their policy goals and see the results of public investments. They thus differ with 
regard to the time horizons of projects, and the desired output. Innovation brokers have clearly 
facilitated cooperation and managed to synchronise expectations of different actor groups during 
a number of innovation processes. They have reportedly made the different project partners 
aware of their institutional backgrounds and expectations and of the role they can fruitfully play 
in the innovation process. Moreover, they were successful in making the risks and benefits that 
are attached to engagement in the innovation process transparent. They are especially useful 
because by doing so they contribute to reducing uncertainty in the early stages of innovation 
processes when there is a high risk of failure, which would discourage private parties from 
innovating (see also Sapsed et al., 2007; Johnson, 2008). In addition, they acted as a ‘translator’ 
between the different ‘worlds’, and performed mediating roles in case of conflict about, for 
example, the attribution of intellectual property rights, strongly diverging goals and visions,  or 
the division of funds. The involvement of innovation brokers in innovation processes, hence, 
avoids inertia and accelerates the process by helping project members maintain their focus and 
energy throughout. Beyond the level of the single project, innovation brokers fulfil a catalyst role 
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(to bring about change and stimulate cooperation) a liaison role (e.g. to inform policy) within the 
agricultural innovation system, and also an ‘innovation capacity building’ role. 
 
3.4 Observations about the Inherent Vulnerabilities of Innovation Brokers 
Not surprisingly, the vulnerabilities that are reported in general (non-agricultural) literature on 
innovation brokers also seem to play a role in the Dutch agricultural innovation system. Below 
we indicate how these expressed themselves, and what lessons can be learned. 
 
a) Neutrality tensions 
Besides the recognition that total neutrality is hard to achieveiii, there are several pressures on 
innovation brokers, which may impair their neutrality. As stated earlier, in an effort to restore 
knowledge infrastructure linkages and optimise innovation system interaction, several parties in 
the Dutch agricultural sector supported the set-up of innovation brokers through concerted 
action. However, a social dilemma manifested in that the benefits for the collective were 
recognised (enhancing innovation systems’ performance by facilitating the formation of linkages 
between system components) but that parties also want to realise conflicting individual goals 
through a broker as a condition for (financial) support.   
 
For example, the providers of research and extension who contributed financially as shareholders 
or financiers of several type 1 and 2 innovation brokers (e.g., the earlier mentioned AKC-NH), 
(explicitly or implicitly) expected some form of return on investment. They wanted to be seen as 
a ‘preferred supplier’ and show unwillingness to cooperate with other (competing) knowledge 
providing parties, hence forcing innovation brokers into the role of procurement instruments. 
Although most innovation brokers did not adhere to such preferred suppliership, this had 
negative effects on their perceived impartiality (especially among other research and extension 
providers) and could, thus, hamper collaboration.  
 
Innovation brokers also risk becoming, or being seen as, vehicles to realise policy objectives of 
financiers. Externally imposed goals may inhibit, or destroy, (informal) interactional patterns 
conducive to innovation. For example, farmers perceived the government-funded broker Nutrient 
Management Support Service as having a direct link with the realisation of undesired 
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government policy, and hence it never gained credibility and quickly disappeared (Klerkx et al., 
2006). Contrasting objectives may also cause loyalty conflicts with financiers and clients. In the 
case of DFA, the Ministry wanted it to focus on certain activities that emphasised advanced in-
depth learning on certain topics, whereas farmers preferred to have more casual knowledge 
exchange on day-to-day experiences in dairy farming with other farmers. So DFA was driven by 
both farmers’ demand, and financiers’ demand, with a resulting dilemma for the broker of whose 
demands to give prevalence to (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). These tensions indicate that 
innovation brokers should be given the freedom to independently operate as a basic condition for 
effectiveness. 
 
b) Functional ambiguity tensions   
In the Dutch agricultural innovation system, independent innovation brokerage is not always 
fully understood and accepted. This is partly due to the response from established players (i.e., 
the established research institutes and extension providers) to the ‘revitalisation and ‘innovation 
catalyst’ mission of innovation brokers, which is about breaking with old structures and 
establishing new networks and partnerships, and partly due to the overlap with existing or new 
functions from ‘traditional’ research and extension providers.  
 
For example, in the case of KnowHouse, a type 1 broker (see Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008div), 
research and extension organisations welcomed it as a demand articulator and network 
composer, but saw it as a competitor in the provision of certain services during the innovation 
process (innovation process management). This caused annoyance among research and extension 
organisations, because they felt KnowHouse forced itself on the project without bringing added 
value, and taking up a part of the project money which otherwise could be used for the research 
itself. Farmers’ representatives positively evaluated KnowHouse’s contribution to innovation, 
but at the same time saw it as a threat in terms of KnowHouse’s role as an opinion leader. There 
was vagueness about the different roles that KnowHouse was meant to play, i.e., whether it is a 
‘sparring partner’ for the development of ideas on innovation, a broker that matches demand and 
supply in the knowledge infrastructure, or a delegated taskmaster for agricultural entrepreneurs 
and hence client of research and extension providers. The result is that though the brokers may 
be a positive influence on network formation and the effectiveness of cooperation in the 
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innovation process, parties may lose confidence in them as they are not sure what it is they 
actually do and whom they represent. This indicates that the role of innovation brokers should be 
made clear to the parties they work with, together with what they can expect from the broker, 
and where each party’s responsibilities lie.  
 
c) Tensions regarding funding and willingness to pay 
Tensions such as low private willingness to pay and public funding impatience have also 
manifested in the Dutch context. These tensions appear to be felt particularly by innovation 
consultants and peer network brokers (types 1, 2, and 3), who offer services to optimise 
innovation at the level of the individual farmer, such as AKC’s KnowHouse and DFA. This 
tension seems to be an inherent characteristic of these types of mechanisms. It also has to be 
understood against the historical backdrop of innovation support services in the Netherlands and 
the fact that these were mainly free of charge in the past. Type 4, 6 and 7 appear to receive more 
continuous funding as the radicalism of the innovations they wish to support is of such a nature 
that it is commonly accepted that private investment will be initially low, or they align with 
public concerns of government. However, these organisations also have to continuously struggle 
to prove their usefulness. This is because the process-oriented services of innovation brokers, 
such as demand articulation and network composition, take place in the early phases of the 
innovation process and are highly intangible and invisible, i.e., non-compatible with SMART 
(Specific, Measurable, Agreed, Realistic, Time-bound) criteria. Also, in their role as innovation 
process managers, innovation brokers sometimes choose to operate in the background or their 
contribution cannot be easily distilled as they operate in multi-actor networks. Thus, the 
contribution of innovation brokers to a successful innovation is, in hindsight, often taken for 
granted by clients, or the specific contribution is hard to define. If this work is done on a fee-for-
service basis, there is often little initial incentive to pay for such a service and organisations 
experience difficulties charging for it. Despite being for profit-organisations, their income is 
often largely derived from public funds through innovation subsidies which they channel. 
Publicly-financed organisations do not have this complication as the cost of these activities is 
covered, but the difficulty of showing the effect of activities on the end result may, 
unfortunately, influence impact evaluations negatively. 
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As a response to these funding tensions and changes in funding schemes (i.e., the gradual 
withdrawal of public funding to make brokers self-financing), broker organisations may also 
simply cease to exist because they cannot make brokerage activities profitable. Another 
possibility is that they become a ‘content-providing’ consultant rather than a facilitator; this may 
hamper the demand articulation and network composition function as brokers are not seen as 
neutral and credible anymore in their function of referral service and matchmakers.  Illustrative 
of the problem of the impact in evaluations and unstable public policy on innovation brokers is 
the case of ISW (Innovation Supportpoint Wageningen). Government-funded ISW had high 
client satisfaction but was nevertheless discontinued. However, one year after dissolving ISW, 
the Ministry of Agriculture decided to co-invest in a pilot project aimed at including the 
agricultural sector within the service provision of Syntens (a non-agricultural innovation broker 
financed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs), and funded the Syntens Agro pilot, which 
essentially provided the same services as ISW.   
 
Despite this vicious circle of short-term funding-disappearance of the broker — and renewed 
funding of a similar broker — the policy is to publicly support innovation brokers (exceptions 
are the systemic instruments in which there is more acceptance that facilitating innovation costs 
time, and that failure is inherent to radical innovation) only temporarily in the hope that they 
become self-sufficient. Here again the dilemma is that the systemic contribution of innovation 
brokers is recognised, but individual actors who benefit from the contribution innovation brokers 
make to the system’s innovation capacity are hesitant to contribute in the long-term to the 
intermediaries’ funding without having a short-term return-on-investment.   
 
Such short-term sight is symptomatic of the current post-privatisation, market-based knowledge 
infrastructure, in which there is an emphasis on short projects that have to compete in 
competitive grant schemes every time to get continued funding and have to serve specific policy 
objectives that may radically change. From the Dutch cases, it became clear that the demand 
articulation and network composition activities need continued public funding, but the 
innovation process management function, if added value is recognised, could be funded by 
means of private payments of network participants. This could then also be done by research and 
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extension service parties who have facilitation as a new activity, and resolve the functional 
ambiguity that is felt.  
 
3.5 Overall lessons from the Netherlands experience 
After 15 years of experimenting, there appears to be growing recognition of the value of 
innovation brokers in the new agricultural innovation system of the Netherlands. This is evident 
in the practice of farmers and policies of government. The fact that it has become more accepted 
is shown by the fact that there is an increase in the number of brokers of all types, which results 
in a complete palette of brokers for different subsectors. This is, however, not the result of 
coordinated policy, but generally of regional or sub-sectoral initiatives as most brokers emerge in 
a bottom-up fashion as a result of a concerted action by both public and private parties — for 
example, regional farmers’ organisations and research establishments feel the need for a broker 
and approach policymakers with a request for (partial) funding. A policy implication is that a 
considerable incubation period is required to change attitudes towards the “invisible” services 
provided by innovation brokers. Without this period of incubation neither policy nor private 
support will emerge to sustain them.   
 
An overriding observation about the effectiveness of innovation brokers in the Netherlands is 
that both their strengths and weaknesses (tensions) arise partially because of inherent 
characteristics of different innovation brokering mechanism and functions. However, it is also 
clear that the effectiveness of these mechanisms can only be properly understood in the context 
of the institutional and political circumstances that gave rise to them. A related point is that the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms also rests on a much wider set of institutional settings than 
might be imagined. For example, the perceptions of the role and (most importantly) the value of 
brokers in society. These perceptions and accepted ways of working are themselves changing 
over time as a result of experimentation with brokering. In other words the incorporation of 
innovation brokers into the overall agricultural innovation capacity of a country is truly 
dependent on a process of institutional and policy learning and this is likely to be a long-term 
process. The effectiveness (and for that matter composition) of innovation brokers in the 
Netherlands was different 10 years ago and, because of the effects of this policy and institutional 
learning process, is likely to be different again in 10 years’ time. This, of course, raises a larger 
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question. If effectiveness of broking mechanisms is determined by institutional and policy 
learning at a macro-level, how can this be accelerated?  This question in turn points to the fact 
that the public policy may have to assume a new role and approach in its efforts to promote 
innovation because, as the Netherlands case has shown, of the systemic and evolutionary nature 
of the capacities involved. 
 
The following sections chalks out some of the practical implications of the Netherlands case for 
developing countries looking to strengthen their innovation capacity. 
 
27 
IV. INNOVATION BROKERS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES: 
OBSERVATIONS AND OPTIONS 
 
We have seen that innovation brokers have been proven to play useful roles in the Dutch 
agricultural innovation system. A relevant question is, of course, whether these experiences bear 
relevance to innovation systems in emerging economies, or whether the conditions in which 
these brokers emerged, and their contributions, are uniquely determined by the Dutch 
institutional setting. Whereas the Dutch agricultural innovation system used to be characterised 
by a great cohesion, and has been affected by full privatisation of the supporting knowledge 
infrastructure, this may be different elsewhere. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that there are 
different cultures of collaboration, which affect the potential for innovation brokers to be 
effective (e.g., Siemsen, 2005; Lenné, 2008). Also, especially in the context of rural poverty, 
differentiated approaches are needed in the design of such systemic intermediaries depending on 
a combination of asset positions and favourable or unfavourable production environments 
(Berdegué and Escobar, 2002; Van Mele, 2008), and gender issues (Caniels et al., 2006). 
However, in many countries conditions and challenges are broadly similar to those in the 
Netherlands — including the need to enhance networking in the innovation system; the need for 
a guiding agent in a fragmented innovation system; and dealing with the challenges of multi-
functional agriculture (Clark, 2002; Sulaiman et al., 2005; Hall, 2006; Spielman et al., 2008). 
Hence, a question that remains here is: who are innovation brokers in the context of developing 
country agriculture? A review of the literature shows that in the context of agricultural 
innovation in developing countries there are already many parties fulfilling innovation brokerage 
roles. Examples include:  
 
• National NGOs: Goldberger (2008) describes the way NGOs have brought together 
several actors in Kenyan agriculture to facilitate the transition to organic agriculture in 
export horticulture production. Cabero and Van Immerzeel (2007) report on Pachamama 
Raymi as a farmer network broker for sharing indigenous knowledge in Bolivia.   
• International NGOs : Clark et al. (2003) and Hall et al. (2007) document the activities of 
an international NGO, International Development Enterprises, in managing respectively 
packing technology and low cost irrigation pump innovations in India and Bangladesh. 
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Other examples of international NGOs are the PROLINNOVA initiative (Waters-Bayer 
et al., 2008) or the Latin-American Grupo Chorlaví (Ramirez and Pino, 2008).   
• (Descendants of) special projects: Bentley and al. (2007) describe the Bolivian Innova 
project, which acted as a demand articulator for farm technology, with subsequent 
network formation. Adeoti and Olubamiwa (2009) report on the ‘cocoa rebirth initiative’ 
to forge linkages in the Nigerian cocoa innovation system. Clark et al. (2007) document 
the evolution of the Andhra Pradesh Netherlands Biotechnology Programme into a self-
financed broker of research and development projects using biotechnology to address 
smallholder agriculture.  
• International donor agencies: Kuada and Sørensen (2005) describe the role of Danish 
development agency Danida in fulfilling the role of a broker in inter-firm collaboration in 
Ghana, and Van Leeuwen et al. (2007) describe a similar role for Dutch development 
organization SNV in several Latin-American countries. 
• Experiments in national research and extension programmes: Hall and Yoganand (2003) 
document experimentation in the Ugandan agricultural extensions systems and the 
creation of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). This provided funds 
to farmers to hire and train private services providers to act as innovation brokers and 
assist with technology and marketing support. The National Agricultural Innovation 
Programme of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, with its focus on the 
establishment of consortia around agricultural development themes, is another example 
of such experimentation (www.naip.icar.org.in).  
• Farmer and industry organisations: Heemskerk and Wennink (2004) describe the role of 
farmers’ organisations in bonding African farmers into farmer groups, connecting these 
with other organisations, and linking them to formalised agricultural research and 
extension to influence research and extension agenda setting and execution. In the 
Colombian cutflower industry, the Ceniflores innovation centre was set up by producers’ 
associations to act as an independent ‘virtual’ broker between the industry and research 
institutes, supporting demand articulation and platform formation (Lee and González, 
2006). Other descriptions of roles such as linking farmers to markets, building innovation 
systems, or supporting territorial development are made by Wennink and Schrader (2007) 
and Abramovay et al. (2008).  
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• Research organisations or affiliates: Spielman et al. (2007) describe the case of the 
AGRONATURA Science Park at the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture 
(CIAT). It hosts private companies and other research, technology, and development 
organisations and aims at building relationships, financing new research projects, and 
promoting private-sector research. Van Mele (2008) suggests that the broker role would 
be a new role for the CGIAR institutes. Devaux et al. (2009) describe the role of the 
International Potato Centre in the context of value chain innovations (i.e. linking farmers 
to markets) through the Papa Andina project, and Kristjanson et al. (2009) describe 
several efforts of the International Livestock Research Institute in facilitating livestock 
husbandry-related innovations. 
• Specialist third party organisations: Hall (2005) describes the International Organisation 
for the Acquisition of Agri Biotechnology Applications (ISAAA), a non-profit 
organisation established to broker access to technologies, genes and protocols owned by 
the private sector or held in public laboratories in developed countries.   
• Government organizations: Hartwich et al. (2007b) describe the Bolivian SIBTA, a 
combined government-NGO supported initiative, which combined a fund for applied 
technical innovation projects and a knowledge management scheme based on the idea of 
markets for local knowledge. Implicitly, this scheme permitted networking among a 
range of agents. Vera-Cruz et al. (2008) describe a similar development of the Mexican 
Produce Foundations. Bell and Juma (2007) and Nelson (2007) describe the respective 
role of the Fundación Chile and CORFO as a booster of the networking with foreign 
technology sources that co-enabled Chile’s agricultural development. 
• ICT-based brokers: Although often on a more operational level (market/production 
information) than for strategic (innovation) purposes a range of ICT-based brokerage 
instruments have been applied to act as ‘infomediaries’ (Rao, 2007), such as information 
kiosks in India through which farmers may access cattle health  information (Ramkunar 
et al., 2007).  
 
The main difference between the already existing brokerage interventions in the developing 
country context and those in the Dutch context appears to lie in the fact that the latter 
interventions concern mainly new and specialised organisations, whereas in the former case 
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many parties fulfilling innovation brokerage roles can be considered ‘traditional’ intermediaries, 
which take up such innovation brokerage functions in addition to their traditional roles as 
representatives, funding agencies, and research organisations. Such new roles have either 
purposefully or serendipitously emerged and were found to have similar beneficial effects on 
innovation as have been reported for the Dutch innovation brokers (e.g. Bentley et al., 2007; 
Kristjanson et al, 2009; Devaux et al., 2009). However, it would be interesting to assess the 
effect of this organisational connection with ‘traditional’ roles (such as research and extension, 
advocacy and representation, and funding) on core values of neutrality and credibility. Having 
mixed identities may have negative effects on the organisational and institutional manoeuvring 
space that is given to execute the brokerage role, and the sustainability of this role, as has been 
noted by several authors (Hulsebosch et al., 2006; Kristjanson et al, 2009; Devaux et al., 2009). 
Positioning innovation brokers as organisationally detached from existing organisations may be 
an option to prevent neutrality tensions and provide more freedom to act as a innovation catalysts 
and bring about institutional change, but also bears its own tensions with regard to neutrality, 
function overlap and funding, as the analysis above has shown.  
 
There are several indications from the Dutch case that these independent brokerage agents need 
some form of continued support by a public funding agency, or through collective funds such as 
farmer levies. Also, in the case of developing countries it has been noted that there is a need for 
such public sector ‘promoting agents’ or ‘system coordinators’ (Rivera et al., 2005; Hartwich et 
al., 2007b). Public or donor funding may be justified since: (1) it appears inherently difficult to 
make the demand articulation and network composition functions self-sufficient; (2) innovation 
brokers contribute to systemic interaction, hence mitigate innovation system failure (which 
would provide a rationale for public intervention — e.g., Smith, 2000), and have a role as 
catalysts of innovation; and (3) innovation brokers can fulfil the role of facilitator more neutrally 
than parties that have a substantive stake in the subsequent research or innovation process. 
Nevertheless, there are also some challenges in this regard, including (1) the difficulty of  
assessing the contribution of innovation brokers though conventional forms of impact evaluation; 
(2) the proper demarcation of the mandate of publicly-financed innovation brokers, as activities 
that go beyond demand articulation and network composition are sometimes perceived as 
competition; and (3) the risk that due to resource dependencies the innovation broker may 
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nevertheless become a more or less ‘hidden messenger’ for government or another party which 
may be detrimental to its impartiality, credibility and hence longevity. 
 
These findings have important implications for governments in developing countries and donors, 
as countries may have less resources and development assistance’s focus on projects is 
inherently susceptible to ‘funding impatience’. This may mean that brokerage roles cease to exist 
when a project has ended (see Clark et al., 2003; Siemsen, 2005; Caniels et al., 2006; Kristjanson 
et al., 2009), but the acquired brokerage skills and social capital built can be used to set up other 
projects. It is thus important to see how in this context innovation brokerage organisations can 
become durably embedded. Possibly, the role of innovation brokers can be played by what is left 
of public agricultural extension services, as has been suggested by several authors (Alex et al., 
2002; Nagel, 2003; Leeuwis, 2004; Sulaiman et al., 2005; Dormon, 2006). However, this then 
requires a shift from technology transfer agents to facilitators, which has major implications in 
terms of organisation structures, cultures and incentive mechanisms, as well as for the 
knowledge and competencies that present and future extensionists need to possess (see Leeuwis, 
2004; Davis et al, 2008).  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
We have argued that it is plausible that investment in innovation brokers may not only be 
sensible in the Dutch context, but also in emerging economies. In fact, we have seen that existing 
organisations expand their mandate and are already taking up brokerage roles. Whether such 
organisations are ideally placed to play these roles should be a subject for further study. The 
Dutch case suggests that specialised innovation brokers can be more neutral and credible in 
fulfilling important roles such as demand articulation, network building and innovation process 
management. In any case, there remains significant scope for existing research and extension 
organisations to ‘retool themselves’ in order to play new roles (Devaux et al., 2009). As 
Kristjanson et al (2009: 6) make us realise, this may not be an easy process: “boundary spanning 
may be institutionalised by creating a new organisation or by making it a function of part of an 
existing organisation. Existing institutions, however, are often disinclined to invest in boundary-
spanning activities that appear extrinsic rather than central to their core mission, whereas 
government and private funding agencies have proved reluctant to invest in the creation of new 
organisations aiming to serve as ‘go-betweens’. Largely for this reason, there exists little 
incentive for individuals to build their careers in the ‘boundary space’.”  
 
Besides the question of who should take up innovation brokerage roles, an important question is 
how to foster their emergence. A striking feature of the Dutch case is that centrally-designed 
blueprints failed, and that successful innovation brokers (even if eventually subsidised) emerged 
in a self-organised manner, building on local, regional or sectoral initiatives, and resulting in a 
very diverse landscape of contextually-embedded innovation brokers. Moreover, we have seen 
that the current configuration has evolved over time, required considerable experimentation and 
institutional adaptation, and continues to be dynamic. Combining the generally bad experiences 
with wholesale transfer of institutional innovations from one country to another, -- the fallacy of 
universal agricultural extension models (Sulaiman and Hall, 2008) --, this should lead to the 
conclusion that we need a policy approach that encourages institutional learning and 
experimentation. Because a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to innovation system interventions is 
inappropriate (Hartwich et al., 2007a), the Dutch innovation brokers should be seen as an 
inspiration rather than a blueprint. In order to allow innovation brokers to emerge and become 
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embedded contextually, we would like to make raise several points that require attention during 
such a process. First, we feel that it is important to adequately map and diagnose the strengths 
and weaknesses of the innovation system to be strengthened, in order to develop a clear vision of 
which weaknesses to tackle, at which system aggregation level, and with what kind of innovation 
ambition (radical or incremental innovation). In doing so, it should also become clear if some 
parties already fulfill a brokerage role and to what extent these may complement or overlap with 
the envisioned task of the innovation broker to be established. When established, a broker 
organisation should be given considerable freedom to explore new options and establish new 
linkages, and not be tied to prescribed input-output schemes and logframe-determined 
performance indicators. It should be recognised that the primary work of innovation brokers is to 
improve the quality of interactions and processes during innovation trajectories, and that this 
includes many intangible contributions to making interdependent actors and networks collaborate 
effectively. In performing such roles they have accountabilities to several parties and thus they 
will always have to perform a balancing act. 
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i
 The basis of the FFS is the belief that if farmers are to gain the confidence to lower dependence on insecticides, 
they need to become acquainted with certain agroecological principles which are best acquired through discovery 
learning. An FFS is a group of farmers (roughly 20–25) who meet periodically (usually once a week) in a designated 
field throughout the major part of the crop cycle (Tripp et al., 2005). Farmer Fields Schools are increasingly seen 
more broadly as a way of farmer-to-farmer extension (Anandajayasekeram et al., 2007). 
ii
 No studies have been carried out so far on the economic efficiency of innovation  brokers. Such a study is not easy 
to carry out given their rather intangible and ‘behind the scenes’ mode of operating. This will be further illustrated in 
section 3.4. 
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iii
 As Groot (2002) argues, facilitators can never act totally neutral because the norms and values  of facilitators 
always (subconsciously)  influence the way they perceive the issue at stake, the choice of their theories and 
methodologies and their actions.  They should hence strive for ‘acceptable’ neutrality.  
iv
 In this publication KnowHouse is referred to with the pseudonym InnoFac, because of  confidentiality concerns at 
the time of the research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
